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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT                           
_____________ 
 
No. 13-3690 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
CHRISTIAN KOWALKO, 
                                           Appellant  
 _____________   
    
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania                                                             
District Court No. 2-11-cr-00248-009 
District Judge: The Honorable Paul S. Diamond                             
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 12, 2014 
 
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, SMITH, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: December 11, 2014) 
                              
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION 
_____________________                              
      
SMITH, Circuit Judge.   
 Following a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania, Christian Kowalko was convicted of conspiracy to 
                                                 
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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distribute anabolic steroids, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), 
841(b)(1)(E) and possession of anabolic steroids with intent to distribute, in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(E).  On appeal, Kowalko challenges 
the sufficiency of the evidence underlying both convictions and the District Court’s 
imposition of a $15,000 fine.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the 
judgment of the District Court.   
I. 
 In late 2010 and early 2011, the Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) was 
immersed in an investigation of Keith Gidelson, whom it suspected of distributing 
anabolic steroids and human growth hormones.  From January to April 2011, DEA 
agents utilized a court-authorized wiretap on Gidelson’s cellular telephone and 
recorded, inter alia, 94 telephone call or text message communications between 
Gidelson and Kowalko.  These communications revealed that Kowalko had 
purchased anabolic steroids, such as testosterone, and other substances, such as 
human growth hormone and clenbuterol, from Gidelson on a regular basis.  They 
also made clear that Kowalko redistributed the testosterone he purchased from 
Gidelson to other customers.  During a call initiated by Kowalko on March 18, 
2011, he asked Gidelson if he could purchase testosterone, insulin-like growth 
factor (“IGF”), and clenbuterol.  Gidelson responded that the drugs were available 
and instructed Kowalko to pick them up at his residence some time before 7:00 
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pm.  Shortly before 7:00 pm, video surveillance recorded Kowalko entering 
Gidelson’s residence and exiting approximately 25 minutes later carrying a blue 
plastic bag.   
 On October 24, 2012, a grand jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
returned a two-count second superseding indictment charging Kowalko with 
conspiracy to distribute anabolic steroids, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 
841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(E), and possession of anabolic steroids with intent to 
distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(E).  Kowalko pled not 
guilty and proceeded to trial on December 4, 2012.  At trial, the Government 
played for the jury 11 phone conversations between Kowalko and Gidelson, 
including the March 18, 2011 conversation initiated by Kowalko, and the two 
video clips showing Kowalko entering Gidelson’s residence and exiting with a 
blue plastic bag.  On December 7, 2012, the jury found Kowalko guilty of both 
charges.  Thereafter, the District Court sentenced Kowalko to 48 months’ 
imprisonment and imposed a $15,000 fine.1  Kowalko’s counsel did not object to 
the fine, and in fact stated that he “d[id not] have a problem with the fine.”  J.A. 
469.  This timely appeal followed. 
                                                 
1  Although the Presentence Report (“PSR”) recommended a Guidelines range of 
100-125 months’ imprisonment, the District Court granted Kowalko’s motion for a 
downward departure on the grounds that the “career offender” designation overstated his 
criminal history, resulting in a new advisory range of 92-115 months.  The District Court 
then varied downwards from this range for a final sentence of 48 months’ imprisonment.  
The $15,000 fine fell on the lower end of the Guidelines range of $10,000 to $1,000,000.   
4 
 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We exercise 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  “In reviewing a jury 
verdict for sufficiency of the evidence, we must consider the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the government and affirm the judgment if there is substantial 
evidence from which any rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.” United States v. Benjamin, 711 F.3d 371, 376 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. 
Ct. 309 (2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  “We review the 
court’s findings as to whether the defendant was able to pay a fine, as well as its 
determination of the amount of any fine, for clear error.”  United States v. Seale, 20 
F.3d 1279, 1284 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. Demes, 941 F.2d 220, 223–
24 (3d Cir. 1991)).    
III. 
 On appeal, Kowalko argues that the Government failed to produce sufficient 
evidence to support his convictions and that the District Court erred by failing to 
consider his ability to pay the $15,000 fine it ultimately imposed.  For the reasons 
that follow, we reject each of these arguments.   
 First, the Government introduced evidence from which a reasonable jury 
could have found Kowalko guilty of possessing with the intent to distribute 
anabolic steroids beyond a reasonable doubt.  Numerous recorded phone 
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conversations revealed that Kowalko regularly purchased testosterone from 
Gidelson and redistributed it to other customers.  Further, based on the evidence 
presented, the jury could have reasonably concluded that on March 18, 2011, 
Kowalko successfully purchased all three drugs that he ordered, including 
testosterone. 
As part of Kowalko’s sufficiency challenge, he also argues that the jury may 
have been confused as to whether the other substances he purchased on March 18, 
2011, were anabolic steroids.  We are not persuaded.  The Government’s expert 
witness never represented to the jury that IGF or clenbuterol are anabolic steroids, 
even though when he did refer to anabolic steroids—such as testosterone, 
Sustosterone, Equipoise, Trenbolone Acetate, Masterone, or Anadrol—he 
explicitly identified them as such.  Further, during closing arguments the 
prosecutor told the jury, in no uncertain terms, that IGF is not an anabolic steroid.  
J.A. 217. 
We also reject Kowalko’s sufficiency challenge to his conviction for 
conspiracy to distribute steroids.  At the outset, Kowalko concedes that he failed to 
raise this claim in the District Court and, accordingly, that we review it on appeal 
for plain error.  Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 465–66 (1997).   
We hold that the District Court did not err, much less plainly err, in 
concluding that a reasonable jury could have found Kowalko guilty of conspiracy 
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to distribute steroids.  The Government introduced evidence that Kowalko 
repeatedly purchased anabolic steroids from Gidelson, and that the two discussed, 
inter alia, (1) Gidelson’s acquisition of anabolic steroids from his supplier; (2) the 
relative quality of different brands of anabolic steroids; and (3) the price Kowalko 
charged his customers for steroids he purchased from Gidelson.  This evidence was 
sufficient to support the jury’s conclusion that Kowalko and Gidelson shared a 
common goal and purpose of distributing anabolic steroids and agreed to work 
together toward that end.  United States v. Iglesias, 535 F.3d 150, 156 (3d Cir. 
2008).   
Lastly, we reject Kowalko’s argument that the District Court erred by 
imposing a $15,000 fine without adequately considering his ability to pay.  
Assuming, arguendo, that this argument has been properly preserved, Kowalko 
bore the burden of coming forward with evidence of his inability pay.  See United 
States v. Kadonsky, 242 F.3d 516, 520 (3d Cir. 2001).  He failed to offer any such 
evidence.  Indeed, at the sentencing hearing, Kowalko stated that he “d[id not] 
have a problem with the fine.”  J.A. 469.  Additionally, although the PSR 
ultimately concluded that Kowalko would have difficulty paying a fine within the 
Guidelines range, the Report also indicated that Kowalko was able to find 
consistent work as a bouncer, which allowed him to earn approximately $200 per 
night.  Additionally, the District Court heard testimony at sentencing indicating 
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that Kowalko would be able to find work upon release.  Given this information, the 
District Court’s selection of a fine on the lower end of the Guidelines range and 
imposition of a fairly modest $200 per month payment obligation following release 
from prison evinced an implicit recognition that Kowalko’s employment prospects 
were limited, but not non-existent.   
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.   
 
 
